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Abstract. In this paper it is argued that political parties may have incentives to adopt a partisan 
view on the working of the economic system. Our approach is based on a dynamical spatial voting 
model in which political parties are policy oriented. This model revolves around two interrelated 
issues xand y. The policy maker sets x directly. There exist two views on the r lationship between 
x and y. Model uncertainty confronts policy makers with the problem of the sel cti n a model 
to base their actions . We show that if voters have imperfect information about he working of 
the economic system that model selection contains a strategic element. Policy makers are inclined 
to adopt a view on the working of the economic system which fits in with their preferences. 
There is no inherent logic that places monetarists to he right of New Economists. They have 
different models of economic mechanism, but they need not have different political values. 
A conservative can be a Keynesian d a liberal a monetarist. These combinations are in fact
surprisingly rare. 
James Tobin, 1974, The New Economies One Decade Older, p. 62. 
1. Introduction 
The economic literature offers a large variety of models of the economy. These 
models often differ in the predictions of the effects of policy variables on target 
variables. So far, statistical analyses have not been able to show convincingly 
the superiority of one of the existing models. One could argue that reality is 
too complex to be captured by a single model. Alternatively, one could argue 
that a correct model exists, but has not been discovered yet. In  any case, at 
present decision makers are confronted with model uncertainty. 
As to economic policy, the presence of model uncertainty raises basically two 
questions. First, how should policy makers take account of model uncertainty 
when forming optimal policy? This question has received much attention in the 
literature. Brainard (1967) shows that uncertainty about the ffects of instru- 
ments on targets should lead to a conservative use of instruments. Christo- 
* I am greatly indebted to Peter Broer, Ben Heydra, Jos Jansen d Wilko Letterie for many help- 
ful suggestions. Furthermore, I would like to thank an anonymous referee for his comments. 
138 
doulakis and Van der Ploeg (1987) demonstrate how conflicting views on the 
same system can be pooled into a compromise model. Once the compromise 
model has been derived, the policy problem can be formulated as a standard 
optimisation problem. An alternative treatment of model uncertainty is to as- 
sign probabilities to each model being correct. The policy problem then 
amounts to maximizing a weighted utility function, with the probabilities serv- 
ing as weights (Frankel and Rockett, 1988; Ghosh and Masson, 1991; and 
Holtham and Hughes Hallet, 1992). 
The second question ishow do policy makers actually deal with model uncer- 
tainty? This question has hitherto received little attention. There is some con- 
sensus that policy makers differ in their views on the economy and that these 
views are connected with their political preferences (Christodoulakis and Van 
der Ploeg, 1987). In the U.S., Republicans seem to have more faith in the invisi- 
ble hand than Democrats and less faith in government intervention (Harris, 
1962 and Tufte, 1978). An explanation for this phenomenon is lacking, 
however, as is expressed by the following quotation: 
There is no inherent logic that places monetarists o the right of New 
Economists. They have different models of economic mechanism, but they 
need not have different political values. A conservative can be a Keynesian 
and a liberal a monetarist. These combinations are in fact surprisingly rare 
(Tobin, 1974:62). 
This paper provides a possible xplanation for the existence of partisan views 
on the economy that is based on the need of political parties for selling partisan 
policies to imperfectly informed voters. We present amodel consistent with the 
notion that political parties differ in their views on the economy. The key ele- 
ments of the model are adopted from two strands in the economic literature. 
First, this paper is related to the rapidly growing literature on partisan 
models of economic policy. In partisan models, political parties have different 
preferences over economic goals, because they represent different constituen- 
cies (Hibb, 1977). Wittman (1977, 1983) shows that when election outcomes are 
uncertain and political parties have different preferences, their policies diverge. 
The implications of partisan models of economic policy conflict with those of 
traditional Downsian models which are based on the assumption that political 
parties olely aim at winning elections. Traditional models predict hat he poli- 
cies of political parties converge. Considerable evidence xists indicating that 
economic outcomes do differ under different political parties. For the U.S., 
Beck (1982), Chappell and Keech (1988) and Hibbs (1986) find that unemploy- 
ment tends .to decline under Democratic administrations and that inflation 
tends to fall when a Republican is in the White House. These findings clearly 
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conflict with the predictions of traditional models but are consistent with the 
predictions of partisan models. In the present paper, we consider a two-party 
system. In line with the empirical results discussed above, we assume that 
political parties have partisan motives. 
Second, this paper is related to the public-choice literature on spatial voting 
models. Even political parties merely interested in policy implementation pur- 
sue office, for office is a means of achieving desirable policies. For this reason, 
partisan models hould include adescription of voter behaviour. In this paper, 
we assume that voters are rational in the sense that every voter votes for the 
party which, if elected, will offer him the highest expected utility. The median 
voter determines which political party wins the elections. However, there is un- 
certainty about he preferences ofthe median voter. As a consequence, noplat- 
form ensures office, so that election outcomes are surrounded with uncertainty 
(Alesina, 1988 and Mitchell, 1987). 
This paper deviates from earlier literature on politico-economic models in 
that model uncertainty is introduced. We assume that there exist two rival 
models of the system which differ in the predictions of the effects of policy on 
targets. Models uncertainty confronts political parties and voters with the 
problem of assigning probabilities to each model being correct. Policy makers 
need a perception of the system to base their actions on and voters need a per- 
ception to evaluate xpected policies of political parties. In this paper, we as- 
sume that ex ante, political parties have the same view of the system: they have 
the same prior beliefs about he two models. These prior beliefs are exogenous 
and might be regarded as the "objective" probabilities of each model being 
true (Ghosh and Masson, 1988). Voters do not know these prior beliefs and 
have no compelling motives to acquire information about hem (see Downs, 
1957 and Mueller, 1989 on rational ignorance). However, voters know political 
parties' preferences and are able to infer the probability weights the incum- 
bents assigns to each model from implemented policy. In the model presented 
in this paper, voters base their view of the system on the view underlying cur- 
rent policy. This leaves room for the incumbent party to affect voters' view by 
basing policy on probability weights which deviate from its actual prior beliefs 
about he models. In doing so, the incumbent party can increase its chances of 
reelection. In this paper, it is shown that political parties are inclined to adopt 
a view on the system which deviates from their actual view and fits in with their 
preferences. 
This paper is organised as follows. The next section discusses the environ- 
ment in which political parties operate. To highlight he key elements of our 
model, we ignore a number of potentially important aspects of government be- 
haviour. We focus on a two-party system lasting two periods. We exclude the 
entry of a third party, assume that all voters vote and ignore passive or active 
learning about he system. In addition, we make simplifying assumptions for 
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technical reasons. As in most previous studies on model uncertainty, the 
preferences of political parties (and voters) are represented by quadratic utility 
functions and the constraints imposed by the system are linear. In Section 3, 
we investigate the decision problems faced by political parties. In particular, 
we examine why and when political parties do adopt a partisan view on the sys- 
tem. In Section 4, we present a numerical example of our model, illustrating 
that the ffects of the adoption of partisan model might be substantial. Section 
5 concludes this paper. 
2. The model 
We consider a two-party system, with party £ and r, which lasts two periods. 
At the beginning of the second period elections are held after which the winning 
party takes office. The model revolves around two interrelated problems or is- 
sues; x and y. Political parties are only concerned with the outcomes of x and 
y. The extension to a model in which political parties also attribute utility to 
being in office per se is straightforward and does not affect the main conclu- 
sions of this paper. The preferences of each political party are represented by 
a linear-quadratic function defined on y and x: 
2 
U e = - ]~ qt-l.[Yt+½.~ext2 ] 0 < q < 1 13 e > 0 (1) 
t=l 
2 
U r = -- E qt- l .[yt+ ½.~r.Xt 21 [3 r > 0 (2) 
t=l 
where 13 e ([~r) represents the costs party g (r) attaches to deviations of x from 
zero, q is the discount factor assumed the same for both parties, and t is the 
time index. Eq. (1) represents party g's preferences and (2) represents party r's 
preferences. The preference functions only differ in the relative weight at- 
tributed to x and y. Throughoutthis paper, it is assumed that party r attaches 
higher costs to deviations of x from zero than party e (15 r > 13e). The preference 
functions are linear in Yt which implies that given x t, the lower is Yt, the higher 
is parties' utility. The linear-quadratic utility assumption is made for con- 
venience. Similar preference functions can be found in monetary policy models 
where y refers to unemployment and x refers to inflation (Persson and Tabelli- 
ni, 1990). 
The policy maker sets x directly, while y is affected by x. The effects of x 
on y are uncertain (e.g., uncertain Phillips curve). There are two conflicting 
views on the relationship between y and x: 
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model 1: Yt = rl'xt + S1 rl < 0 (3) 
model 2: Yt = r2-xt + s2 r2 < rl < O. (4) 
The parameters of the two models, rl, r 2, s 1 and S2, are fixed and known. The 
assumption that r 2 < r 1 < 0 is made to facilitate the discussion of the results, 
but does not alter the tenor of the conclusions of this paper. What matters is 
that r 1 ~ r 2. At the time that policy is decided, the true model is unknown. As 
a consequence, policy makers must use probabilities that one of the two models 
is correct. In the present paper, these probabilities play an important role. Let 
us indicate n (0 _ n _< 1) the (internal) prior beliefs of the political parties that 
model 1 is correct and ( l -n )  that model 2 is correct. Furthermore, let ne (nr) 
denote the probability announced by party g (r) that model 1 is correct. One of 
the main objectives of this paper is to show that partisan motives (13 e < I~r) 
may lead to the adoption of partisan views on the working of the system (he 
nr). In this paper, the adoption of a partisan view is understood to mean 
that a political party announces prior beliefs about the model which deviate 
from its actual prior beliefs, and that current policy is based on the announced 
(or external) prior beliefs. If policy makers had different prior beliefs about he 
two models this would directly lead to the adoption of partisan views. Obvious- 
ly, this would be the result of different prior beliefs, rather than the result of 
partisan motives. For this reason, we assume that the two political parties have 
equal prior beliefs. In addition, we assume for simplicity that n is exogenous 
and stable over time. Thus we ignore passive and active learning. 
Our way of treating model uncertainty is based on Christodoulakis and Van 
der Ploeg (1987). Model uncertainty confronts policy makers with the problem 
of the selection of a model to base their actions on. Eq. (3) and (4) should be 
interpreted as the reduced-form equations derived from rival complicated sys- 
tems. Statistical analyses are assumed not to be able to show the superiority of 
one of these systems. As a consequence, policy makers must assign probability 
weights to each model being true. 
As mentioned before, at the beginning of period 2 elections take place. 
Voters are forward looking. They are informed about he preferences of politi- 
cal parties and about the announced prior beliefs of political parties about the 
two models (n e and nr). However, voters do not know the actual prior beliefs 
of political parties (n). Following Alesina (1988) and Alesina and Rosenthal 
(1989), we assume that political parties cannot make binding commitments. In
this respect, we deviate from numerous previous tudies which are based on the 
assumption that policy makers keep their promises (see, e.g., Wittman, 1983 
and Calvert, 1985). In this setting, rational voting decisions are based on the 
policies political parties are expected to follow in period 2. 
Each voter votes for the party which, if elected, offers him the highest ex- 
pected utility. Thus voter i casts his ballot for party ~ if 
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Ui, e > Ui, r (5) 
where Ui, e (Ui,r) is voter i's expected period 2 utility if party e (r) wins the 
elections. 
Voters, like the political parties, have quadratic-linear p eferences defined 
on x and y. If party j wins the elections expected utility is given by: 
Ui,j = _ye  _ 1 e 2 j,2 t~'l~i'Xj,2 j = e,r 
_ _ e - (1 . s2 ) _ t~ .~i.x],2 -- ~v,i-(rl'xj,2 + Sl) --~v,i) (r2"x~,2 -[- 1 e 2 (6) 
where x~, 2 and Y~,2 are the expected values of x 2 and Y2, respectively, if party 
j is elected. 1 Furthermore, ~tv, i represents voter i's beliefs about the two possi- 
ble models and 13 i is the weight voter i attributes to x. Throughout this paper, 
we assume that all voters have the same prior beliefs: nv,i = roy" 
From (5) and (6) it follows that at the elections, voter i casts his ballot for 
party e if 
e e e e" 1A ~ (re 2 ve 25 ~v'rl'(Xr,2--xe,2) + (1-nv).r2.(Xr,a-Xe,2) + "-. i. "r,a -%2,  > 0. (7) 
Voters differ in the preference weight hey attribute to x. We assume that there 
is a continuum of voters in terms of 13 i and that all voters vote so that the 
median voter determines which party wins the elections. As in Wittman (1983), 
Calvert (1985) and Alesina (1988), the election outcomes are surrounded with 
uncertainty. The median voter's preference weight, 13 m, is not known with 
certainty. The distribution of [~m is assumed to be uniform over [[~e-e, 13e + e] 
where 13em is the expected preference weight of the median voter and e is the 
half-width of the distribution. 
Let Pe denote the probability that party e will win the elections. From (7) it 
is easy to see that, provided that xee, a > Xr,a ,e Pe is equal to the probability that 2 
~nv.r 1 + (1-~v).r2~ 
~m < -2"  Q xe--g,2 + ~ -)" (8) 
Thus Pe is equal to the area under the distribution function of ~m to the left 
of (8): 
13 e nv.r 1 + (1 -n0 . r  E e e 
Pe = Pt(Xr,2,xe,2,ffv ) = 1/2 2.e e.(x~,2+xre,2 ) (9) 
Of course, the probability that party r will win elections is equal to (1-Pe). 
The probability function Pe exhibits a well-known feature of spatial voting 
models. Its first derivatives to xe,2 and x~, 2 are negative which implies that if 
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the (expected) policy of one party moves towards the policy of the other party, 
it increases its chances of winning the elections. 
The introduction of model uncertainty into voting models raises two issues. 
First, model uncertainty confronts voters, like political parties, with the 
problem of the selection of a model to base their actions on, n v. In general, 
we may expect hat voters have little information about the working of the sys- 
tem. The concept of model uncertainty adopted in this paper leaves no scope 
for learning about the system on the basis of past outcomes. Moreover, as ar- 
gued by Downs (1957), rational voters do not expend much time gathering in- 
formation, because ach vote has a negligible probability of affecting the elec- 
tion outcomes. For these reasons, voters will rely on information readily 
available, such as the information supplied by the political parties (n e and nr)" 
At this point, it makes ense to distinguish information provided by the incum- 
bent party and information provided by the opposition party. If, for example, 
the incumbent party announces that model 1 is the true model while it bases 
policy on model 2, no voter will believe the announcement. Credibility of the 
announcement requires at least that a party acts according to it. By nature, the 
opposition party does not face such a constraint. However, the opposition 
party is not able to enforce its announcement ei her. Given this asymmetry be- 
tween the incumbent and opposition party, it seems natural to assume that 
voters attribute higher weight to a credible announcement by the incumbent 
party than to the announcement by the opposition party. In this paper, we as- 
sume that ~v is based on the implicit probability that model 1 is correct if it 
emerges from policy in period 1.3 Thus if in period 1 policy is based on, let us 
say, n*, we get n v -- n*. 4 This assumption implies that the party, being in 
office in period 1, is able to affect voters' view on the working of the system. 
A second issue raised by model uncertainty concerns the determination of
the policies political parties are expected to follow when elected, x~, 2and xre2 . 
In period 2, the incumbent does not face an election constraint and thus can 
simply follow its most preferred policy. As a consequence, the incumbent has 
no incentive to deviate from its actual prior beliefs about the two possible 
models. Thus in period 2 policy is based on n. By assumption, voters do not 
know n, but only know n~ and n r. We assume that voters' predict policy mak- 
ers' prior beliefs by simply extrapolating the vi ws policy makers would have 
adopted, when in office, in period 1. Hence voters ignore the strategic implica- 
tions of the behaviour of the incumbent party. This implies that the expected 
policy of a party is a function of its announced beliefs about the possible 
models and that the priors announced by one party do not affect he expected 
policy of the other party, 0X~,2/07¢ r = 63xe ,2 /~ f = 0. 5 
The above assumptions are made for simplicity and are more restrictive than 
necessary. In fact, the assumptions attribute some irrationality to voters, for 
they imply that voters ignore possible strategic behaviour of political parties 
144 
concerning the selection of ~e and fir" As a consequence, voters predictions for 
period 2 policy will generally not come true. However, all the results of this 
paper still hold if policy makers were forced to adhere to their announced prior 
beliefs, so that in period 2 policy would be based on neor n r. In such a setting, 
voters expectations come true. 
3. Partisan views on the system 
In the previous ection we have described the environment in which political 
parties operate. A central aspect of the environment is that voters do not ob- 
serve the actual prior beliefs of political parties about the two alternative 
models describing the working of the system. This leaves room for a political 
party to adopt a view on the system being at variance with its actual view. In 
this section, we show why a political party has an incentive to do so and which 
view on the system it will adopt. To this end, we examine the policy problems 
faced by political parties. First, let us consider the policy problem in period 2. 
In period 2, the party in office does not face an election constraint and has 
consequently no incentive to deviate from its actual prior beliefs. Thus the in- 
cumbent party will simply follow its most preferred policy, which results from 
maximising: 
Uj ,  2 = - {n.[rl.xj,2+Sl] + (1-rc).[r2.xj,2+s2] + ½.[~j .x j ,2  2} j =eor  r (10) 
with respect o xj, z, yielding: 
xj, 2 = - [7~.r 1+ (1 -rc).rz]/13 j. (11) 
Eq. (I 1) shows that in period 2, policy depends linearly on the multipliers of 
the two models weighted by the priors reflecting the actual beliefs of the politi- 
cal parties about the models, n. Since [3 e < ~r, we have xe, 2 > Xr, 2. 
Let us now consider the first period. Suppose that party eis in office. In peri- 
od 1, party e selects policy, xe3 and its (announced) view, he, xe,1 is based on. 
Maximising utility amounts to maximising: 6 
e e e We Ug, t(xe, t,• ) + q. [P~(xe, z Xr,2,;%).Ue,2(xe,2) 
+ [1 - P~(x~,2,Xr~,/,r~v)].Ue,2(xr,2) I (12) 
where 
Ue, l(Xe, l,rQ = _ [rc.[rl.xe, l +s 1] + (l-~).[r2.xe, 1 +S 2] 
+ ½.f~exe,121, (13) 
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Pe(x~z,Xre 2,nv) is given by (9), with x~, 2 = -[ne.r 1 + (l-rce).r2l/~eand rcv= n~, 
provided that policy in period 1 is based on nr Ue,2 (x~,2) is given by (10), for 
j = f,r, and Ue,2(Xr,2) denotes the utility party f receives when party r wins the 
elections. Eq. (12) expresses that party f maximises the discounted utility over 
period 1 and 2. The first term of (12) refers to period 1 utility. The second term 
denotes period 2 utility which is equal to the probability that party f wins the 
elections times the utility from implementing xe, 2 plus the probability that 
party r wins the elections times the utility received from Xr, 2 (Wittman, 1983). 
In spite of the two-period structure of the optimisation problem, the model is 
static in the sense that policy in one period does not directly affect utility in the 
other period. This implies that, in the absence of strategic behaviour as to the 
selection of a view on the system, xe, 1 can be derived from maximising (13) 
with respect o xe, p yielding: 
xe, 1 = - [n . r  1 + (1-~).r2]/~e. (14) 
However, there is an indirect effect of policy in period 1 on period 2 utility, 
which runs through the probability function Pe(x~,z,x~,z,nv). As discussed in 
the previous ection, the incumbent party can affect he probability of winning 
elections by announcing a proper view on the working of the system, ne.n e af- 
fects P~(.) through its effect on voters' view on the system, n v, and through its 
effect on the policy party g is expected to follow in period 2, x e By assump- e,2" 
tion, the announced n e is only credible if the incumbent party acts according 
to it. Thus in case of strategic behaviour of the incumbent party as to model 
selection, policy in period 1 is given by: 
xe, ~ = -[rte.r I + (1 -ne) . r2] /~e (15) 
where xe, I is the policy most preferred by party g given n e. 
Now that the policy rules (11) and (15) have been derived, we can proceed 
with the determination of the optimal value of rce. Two questions have to be 
answered. First, why should a political party adopt a view on the system - and 
act according to it - which is at variance with its actual view. Second, which 
view on the system does a political party adopt? 
To answer these questions, it is convenient to analyze the effects of n e on the 
period 1 utility and period 2 utility separately. Let us first consider period 1 util- 
ky which is represented by the first term of (12). By assumption, the adoption 
of a partisan view, n ~ n e, only affects outcomes if in period 1 policy is based 
on n e. Thus the adoption of a partisan view forces the incumbent party in 
period 1 to base its actions on "wrong" prior beliefs about the two models. 
Of course, costs are involved with basing policy on wrong priors. The reduction 
of period 1 utility, resulting from a deviation of n e from n, can be regarded as 
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the costs of adopting aview of the system. By inserting (15) in (13) and differen- 
tiating with respect o he, we find the "marginal costs" of the adoption of a 
partisan view, C~e: 
C=e = [ne-n] . [ r z - r l ]2 /~e.  (16) 
Eq. (16) shows that marginal costs of n e are zero when n e = n .  Furthermore, 
(16) reveals that the more the adopted view deviates from the actual view, the 
higher are the costs. 
Now consider period 2 utility which is represented by the second term of (12). 
In period 2 policy is based on n, irrespective of which party wins the elections. 
Due to this a change in n e only affects period 2 utility through its effect on 
Pc(-)" Differentiating the second term of (12) with respect to n e leads to the fol- 
lowing expression, Rne:7 
Rze= I'q'(r2-rl)'xre'2 l ' [ge ,2 (xe) -Ue ,2(Xr ) ] 'e  e 2 (17) 
e.(xe, 2 + Xr, 2) 
Since x e maximises Ue,2(.) and xe, 2 # Xr,2, we know that party g prefers its own 
policy to the policy of party r: 
Ug,2(xg,2) -- U i ,2 (~,2)  > O. 
This implies that the sign of Rne is determined by the effect of n e on the proba- 
bility function Pc(-) which is given by the term in braces in (17). Since r2-r 1 < 
0, a rise in n e decreases the probability that party g wins the elections. Hence 
party e can increase period 2 utility by reducing he. 8 This is the source of party 
¢'s incentive to adopt a view on the system which deviates from its actual view: 
n e < n increases the probability that in period 2 its most preferred policy is im- 
plemented. Eq. (17) can be interpreted as party g's marginal benefits of attribut- 
ing a lower weight o model 1. In a similar way, we can derive that when party 
r is in office in period 1, it can increase period 2 utility by selecting a view, n r, 
for which n r > × holds. 
What is the intuition behind these results? In our model, parties are policy 
oriented. Nevertheless parties are interested inwinning the elections, since win- 
ning elections enables them to implement their most preferred policies in period 
2. In parties' struggle for votes, they try to convince voters of the advantages 
of their policies. Voters know that under party g x will be higher than under 
party r. For every voter the costs of using x are known, but the benefits of using 
x, in terms of its effect on y, are uncertain. Information about the effects of 
x on y is supplied by the parties. In doing this, they realise that voters trade 
the benefits of x against he costs of using x. As a consequence, party e, 
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favouring a higher value of x than party r, has an incentive to emphasize that 
x is an effective mean to reducing y. This is supported by model 2 which 
predicts a high negative ffect of x on y. In contrast to party e, party r tries to 
convince voters that a conservative use of x is optimal. Given voters' prefer- 
ences, the smaller are the benefits of using x, the lower are the optimal values 
of x. Thus party r has an incentive to attribute a high prior to the model, 
predicting a low negative ffect of x on y. 
Finally, we must determine which view on the system political parties adopt. 
In selecting n e, party e trades benefits against costs of adopting a partisan 
view. Party e chooses n e at the point where marginal benefits equal marginal 
costs, Rne = Cne.9 From (16) and (17) it is easy to derive that ne bec°mes:l° 
n e = n + q'13rxre'2 [Ue'2(Xe'2)-Ue'2(Xr'2)] (18) 
e.(x~,2 + x~,2) r z - r  I 
In a similar way, we can derive the view on the system that party r would adopt 
when in office in period 1: 
n r = n -  q'13r'Xre'2 [Ur'2(x~'2)-Ur'2(xe'2)] (19) 
e e e. (xe, 2 + Xr,2) r 2-  r I 
From (18) and (19) its easy to see that ne < n < n r. Thus in our model, parti- 
san preferences lead to the adoption of partisan views on the working of the 
system. Two properties of (18) and (19) are worth mentioning. First, the higher 
is the discount factor, q, the bigger is the difference between the adopted view 
and the actual view of political parties. Second, the more polarised are political 
parties, the more polarised are their adopted views on the system. The idea be- 
hind the two properties is simple. An increase in the discount factor implies 
that political parties attribute higher weight o period 2utility. Due to this, win- 
ning the elections becomes more important. Polarisation also makes winning 
the election more important. The benefits of the adoption of a partisan view 
run through the probability function of winning elections. Hence the benefits 
of adopting a partisan view increase. 
4. A simple numerical example 
In the previous ection we have discussed a simple political model in which po- 
litical parties adopt a partisan view of the economic system which fits in with 
their preferences in order to increase their chances of reelection. By assump- 
tion, the adoption of a partisan view only makes ense if the party in office acts 
according to it. In our model the adoption of a partisan view increases partisan 
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Table 1. Simulation results 
party f party r 
xi3 1,12 0.26 
xi, 2 1.00 0.50 
~t i 0.44 0.74 
n 0.50 0.50 
cycles in economic variables. In this section, we present a simple numerical 
example, highlighting these results. 
Suppose that there exist two views on the economy: 
model 1: Yl = 0 (r 1 = O) 
and 
model 2: Yl = -x  (r 2 = - 1) 
The probability that model 1 is correct is equal to ½(n = ½). The weights party 
g and party r attribute to x (13i) in the toss function are equal to ½ and 1, 
respectively. The median voter's preference weight (13na) lies within the 
0.65-0.85 range. All players in the model give equal weight to utility received 
in period 1 and period 2 (q = 1). 
Using (1), (2), (9), (11), (15), (18) and (19) we can now calculate (by approxi- 
mation) the outcomes of the model. The results are presented in Table 1. 
Table 1 clearly shows that the effects of adopting a partisan view of the econ- 
omy on policy may be substantial. When parties have no incentives to adopt 
a partisan view, as in period 2, party f opts for a x that is twice as big as the 
x chosen by party r. When partisan views are adopted xe becomes four times 
as big as xp 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper we have demonstrated that political parties may have incentives 
to adopt a partisan view on the working of the economic system. Our approach 
is based on a dynamic spatial voting model in which political parties are policy 
oriented. This model revolves around two interrelated issues x and y. The 
policy maker sets x directly. There exist two views on the relationship between 
x and y. Model uncertainty confronts policy makers and voters with the 
problem of the selection of a model to base their decisions on. In our paper, 
voters adopt the view on the system underlying current policy. We have shown 
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that in this setting, model selection contains a strategic element. By adopting 
a partisan view of the system, the incumbent party can increase its chances of 
reelection. Policy makers are inclined to adopt a view which fits in with their 
preferences. 
Notes 
1. Throughout his paper, superscript e refers to expectations formed by voters. 
2. Since I~e > I~r and political parties are issue oriented, it is natural to assume that x~, 2 > Xre,2. 
Later this inequality will be derived formally. 
3. Voters observe policy in period 1 and know the parameters of the models and the preferences 
of the parties. As will become clear later (see eq. (15)), from this information voters can derive 
the view on the system which underlies policy in period 1. 
4. We are aware that this assumptions i  restrictive. In practice, political parties expend much 
time and money to enhance their own credibility and to reduce the credibility of their oppo- 
nents. Moreover, outcomes for x and y are probably also important. The assumptions made 
in this paper should be seen as a first step into the direction of a richer model. 
5. In fact, we consider Nash equilibria, according to which party e determines its strategy given 
the strategy of party r and party r determines its strategy given the strategy of party e. 
6. Since the effects of x on y are uncertain, parties maximise xpected utility. To avoid confusion, 
we only use the term "expected" in connection with voters' expectations concerning policies 
in period 2, x~, 2and Xre2. 
7. We assume that in period 1 policy is based on n e which implies n v = n e and x~, 2 = -[ne.rl + (1--  
ne).r2]/~ e (see section 1). 
8. Of course the choice of n e is restricted (0 _< n e <_ 1). 
9. If at he=0, R~e > Cne, then party e selects ne=O. 
10. There is also a direct way to derive ne. Insert (15), through (13) in (12). Next substitute (9) into 
(12), taking n v = n e and x~,2= -[ne.r 1 + (1-~re).r2]/13 e. Then differentiate with respect to n e. Af- 
ter some rearrangements, we find (18). The second-order condition for a maximum implies 
that (OUe, l(.)2/O2ne) + (OPt(.)2/O2ne).q.[Ue,2)-Ue,2(Xr,2)] < 0 which holds. 
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